the negative information and outcomes are not specifically exclude d from non environ-I. INTROD U CTION mental groups in society, they may also benefit (or harm) others, and this is the Some people hail the use of biotechnolsense in which the information has potenogy to create genetically modified (G M) tial public goo d attributes across groups in products as a major new revolution in society (Cornes and Sandler 1996; A nproduct innova tion.
1 H owever, not everydreoni 1990) . If those not in environmental one views these produ cts favorably. E nvigroups could be effectively exclud ed from ronmental group s like G reenpeace and Friends of the E arth have become the main antagon ists against the use of genetic engiThe authors are, respectively, research economist at neering for development of new products. This work was supported through a grant from the fects of using G M products could be disas- University of Wisconsin System the benefits, the negative information would be a club good to the environm ental group (Cornes and Sandler 1996) . 4 In this paper, we postu late that negative G M information supplie d by an environmental group has public goo d value. We estimate this public good value throu gh the eyes of an environm ental group m em ber by quantifying the "perceived public good" value to consum ers who participated in ex- formation, (2) both pro-and anti-bio tech-nology information, (3) both pro-biotechwill lead to a loss. Participants were given nology and verifiable (third-party) infordetailed instructions on the rando m nth mation, or (4) pro-biot echnolo gy, antiprice auction, includ ing an example writbiotechnology, and verifiable (third-party) ten on the board. A fter the participants information. These four information treatlearned about the auction, a short quiz was ments, each with two replications, were given to ensure that everyone understood rando mly assign ed to eight experimental how the auction worked. units, each containing 13 to 16 participants.
Step 3 was the first practice round of The data collected from participants in the biddin g, where participants bid on a brandexperiment provide a uniq ue data set that name candy bar. The participants were allows us to examine how consumer behavasked to examine the product and then ior towards G M food changed when inforplace a (sealed) bid on the candy bar. The mation from environmental groups is inbids were collected and the first round of troduced .
practice biddin g was over. Throughou t the The experiment can be summarized in auction, when the participants were bidten steps.
5 When participants arrived at the ding on items in a particular round, they lab, they signed consent forms agreeing had no indication of what other items they to participate in the auction. A fter they may be bidding on in future roun ds or if signed the forms, they were given $40 for additiona l rounds would occur. participating and an ID number to use in
Step 4 was the second practice round of order to preserve their anonymity. The biddin g. In this round , the participants bid participants then read a brief set of instrucseparately on three different items. The tions and filled out a questionn aire.
three products were the same brand-name Step 2 introduced the auction . We used candy bar, a deck of playing cards, and a a rando m nth price auction in this experibox of pens. The consum ers were asked ment (Shogr en et al. 2001) . The advantages to examine the three products in practice of the random nth price auction are that round two and make bids on the products. it is demand revealing in theory and the Then the bids were collected. O nly one auction attempts to engage bidde rs at all of the two round s was chosen as bind ing locations along the demand curve.
6 The (valid), so that participants would not take rando m nth price works as follows: each home more than one of any produ ct. The of k bidd ers submits a bid for one unit of a reason was to eliminate price reduction good ; then each of the bids is rank-ordered due to the consumer buying a larger quanfrom highe st to lowest. The auction monitity because of diminishing marginal utility tor then selects a rando m number that is of these products (i.e., lower prices due drawn from a uniform distribution beto a consu mer's negatively slop ed demand tween 2 and k , and the monitor sells one curve). Participants were informed that unit of the good to each of the (n -1) only one of the two rounds would bind highe st bidders at the nth price. For inbefore
Step 3 and were reminded of this stance, if the monitor randomly selects n 5 again before Step 4. 5, the four highe st bidde rs each purchase A fter the two practice auction roun ds one unit of the good priced at the fifthwere completed, the binding round and the highe st bid. E x ante, bidde rs who have low bindin g nth prices were revealed in Step or moderate valuations now have a non-5. A ll of the bids were written on the blacktrivial chance to buy the good because the board, and the nth prices were circled for price is determined rando mly. This auction each of the three products. Participants increases the odds that insincere bidding could see immediately what items they won and the market-clearing price. The 5 The complete set of information given to participarticipants were notified that all purpants is available upon request from the authors. chases of good s would take place after the 6 For a more detailed description of the benefits of the random nth-price auction (see Shogren et al. 2001) .
experiment was over, so that all exchanges of money for goods would take place at Two auction round s followed the distrithe end of the session. bution of information. O ne of the two In Step 6, information about biotechnolrounds had the participants bid on three ogy was released to the participants. The food products with just a standard food possible types of information a participant label. 9 The other round had participants could receive were as follows: (1) the inbid on the same food produ cts with the dustry perspective-a collection of statesame label, except there was a sentence ments and information on genetic modifiadded indicating that the food had been cation provide d by a group of leading genetically engineered. We used three difbiotechnology companies, including Monferent food products: vegetable oil (made santo and Synge nta; (2) the environm ental from soybe ans), tortilla chips (made from group perspective-a collection of stateyellow corn), and russet potatoes. These ments and information on genetic modifiproducts were chosen because both G M cation from G reenpeace, a leading enviand non-G M version s of these produ cts ronmental group; and (3) the third-party, were obtainable; they are neither strong verifiable perspective-a statement on gecomplements nor substitutes, so an innetic modification approved by a thirdcrease in the probability of purchasing one party group, consisting of a variety of indiproduct should have little or no effect on vidua ls knowle dgeable about G M goods, bids for the other products; having three including scientists, professionals, religious products ensures that, if a consum er has leaders, and academics, none of whom have no demand for one or two products, we a significant financial stake in GM foods.
can still get information on his/her preferTo help the participants unde rstand these ence for genetic modification on the other different sources of information, the volitem(s); and these products have different ume of information released of each type properties, as it is plausib le that consumers was limited to one 8 1/2" 3 11" page, and would view genetic modification differently it was organized into five categorieswith respect to these different products. general information, scientific impact, hu-
The labels for these products were made man impact, financial impact, and environas plain as possible to avoid any influence mental impact-to ease the information on the bids from the label design. The seprocessing load on participants. The exact quencing of G M labels was randomized sheets given to participants are available across experimental units. E ach combinain R ousu et al. (2002) or from the authors tion of information was given to two experon request.
imental units, that is, two replications. O ne The information was randomized to creof these experimental units bid on food ate four treatments of information combinawith the standard label in round one and tions: pro-biotechnology information; both on food with the label indicating genetic pro-and anti-biotechnology information; 7 modification in round two. The other expro-biotechnology and third-party, verifiperimental unit bid on food with the label able information; 8 and pro-biotechn ology, indicating genetic modification in roun d anti-biotechnology, and third-party, verifione and on food with the standard label able information. These four combinations were randomized among all eight experiin round two. For each experimental unit, mental units, with each information combionly one of the two food round s was chonation going to two experimental units.
sen as the binding round. This avoide d the problem of bid prices being reduced as consu mers moved along their demand 7 When a participant received both pro-biotechnolcurve.
ogy and anti-biotechnology information, the order was randomized so that some participants received the probiotechnology information first, and others received the 9 The exact labels are available for viewing in R ousu anti-biotechnology information first.
8 When third-party information was distributed, it et al. (2002) or are available from the authors upon request. always was distributed after the other information types.
In
Step 7, participants bid on three difjects with a food item and then ask them to "upgrade" to another food item; rather ferent food products: a bag of potatoes, a bottle of vegetable oil, and a bag of tortilla participants are paid $40 and then bid on different foods in only two trials. This chips. The participants were instructed to examine the three products and then write avoids the risk of an in-kind endowment effect or an increase in valuation to an down their (sealed) bid for each of the three good s. Participants bid on each good individu al that occurs when he/she is given a product. This effect is reflected in an separately. Then the bids were collected from the individ uals, and the participants individu al's willingne ss to pay for a particular goo d being significantly less than his/ were informed that they were about to look at another group of food items.
her willingn ess to accept, given the endowment. A n endo wment effect is of concern Step 8 had participants examine the same three food products, but with the difbecause it might distort a participant's bidding behavior (e.g., Lusk and Shroeder ferent labels (the second trial). A fter the participants examined the produ cts, they 2002 or Corrigan and R ousu 2003) . In addition, by paying each person a $40 participawere instructed to bid on the three products. E ach good was bid on separately. The tion fee we virtually eliminate the possibility that someone will not have adequate bids were then collected from all of the participants. O nce again, before Step 7, resources to place a bid on a product (i.e., we eliminate the credit constraint). Third, consum ers were informed that only one of the two trials or bidding rounds would bind we randomly assigned treatments to the experimental units, so estimating the treatment and they were told this again before Step 8.
Step 9, we selected which of the two effect is simply the difference in means across treatments (see Wooldridge 2002). trials would be chosen as binding, along with the binding nth prices. A fter the bindFourth, we use adult consum ers over 18 years of age from two different midwestern ing round and bindin g nth prices were revealed, the winners were notified, and the metropolitan areas that were chosen using a random digit dialing method. Table 1 participants were asked to complete a brief post-auction questionna ire. In Step 10, the summarizes their demographic characteristics. The demographics of our sample do participants who did not win any products were informed that they were free to leave, not perfectly match the U .S. census demographic characteristics for these regions and the participants who won products exchanged money for their goods, and then (U .S. Census Bureau 2002) , but they are similar and provid e a sufficient representathey were free to leave.
A lthou gh our experimental design foltion for our initial probe into labeling and information for G M produ cts. In addition, lows standard procedures (e.g., Shogr en et al. [1994] ), we made several refinements we use common food items that are available to shoppe rs in grocery stores and suto better reflect consumer purchases. First, subjects subm itted only one bid per prodpermarkets. Furthermore, we use adults rather than students to better reflect a typiuct to avoid any question of creating affiliated values. A ffiliation exists when the bid cal house hold of consumers. A lthough several studies have used college unde rgraduof a high-value bidd er signals commonly perceived, but unkn own, characteristics of ates in laboratory auction s of food items (Lusk et al. 2001; H ayes et al. 1995) , they a produ ct, which increases the odds that other bidd ers will also put a high value on are not the best choice for participants when the items being auction ed are ones the good (see Milgrom and Weber [1982] ). In effect, independent private values are sold in grocery stores or supermarkets. U sing a national rando m sample of grotransformed into affiliated values, which can affect the demand-revealing nature of cery store shoppe rs, Katsara et al. (2001) showed that the share of college-age (18 the Vickrey-style random nth-price auction (see, for example, List and Shogren, to 24) shopp ers falls far below their share in the popula tion (8.5% of shoppers versus [1999] ). Second, we do not endow our sub-L and E conom ics 12.8% in the U .S. Census of Popu lation).
TA BLE 1 Ch ar a ct er ist ics of t h e A u ct ion Pa r t icipan t s (n 5 114)
off. 10 Second , assuming consum ers maximize their utility subject to a budge t conCollege stud ents obtain a large share of straint, one computes the expenditur e their food from school cafeterias and a function when the consumer has and does small share from grocery stores and supernot have the new information. Third, once markets compared to older shoppers (Carlthe new information is provide d, if a conson, Kinsey, and Nadav 1998). A lthough sumer's purchases do not change, the inour participants are slightly skewed toward formation is treated as having no valuewomen, Katsara et al. (2001) showed that clearly a lower-bound estimate. If the conwomen make up a disp roportional share of sumer purchases a different bundle , he/she grocery store shoppers (83% of shoppe rs is presumed to be better off with the new versus 52% in the U .S. Census of Populainformation. Conceptually, the value of intion). A sample primarily of grocery store formation is the difference in the expendishoppers also weakens the sometimesture function for a given utility with and stated need for having stud ents participate without new information. This occurs bein several roun ds of biddin g to stabilize cause, if a consumer changes his/her behavbids for food items. We also minimize ior after receiving the new information, this H awthorne effects in bidding, that is, an information allowed him/her to make "betindividual's behavior changes because they ter" purchasing decisions and spend less participate in an experiment with a particumoney to reach any given level of utility.
11 lar objective (see Melton et al. 1996) . Formally, information from environmental groups causes some consumers to switch
III. EMPIRICA L MOD EL R ousu et al.: E stim ating the Public V alue of Conflicting Information
[4]
from G M-labeled to plain-labeled foods because they realize they receive higher surplus from consuming plain-labeled foods than To determine the average value of inforthey receive from consuming G M-labeled mation from environm ental groups to a foods: 12 consu mer who switched from G M-labeled to plain-labeled foods, we divide the total surplus j plain-labeled 5 WTP j plain-labeled 2 P j plain-labeled [1] value of information by the num ber of consumers who switched purchases:
switchervalue 5 SU MVA L N buy 2 switchedproduct .
[5]
The value of information to each person We obtain the average value of informawho switches is estimated by the difference tion per consum er by dividing the total in consumer surplus between the plainvalue of information by the total number labeled and G M-labeled foods: 13 of consumers:
A ll consumers who purchased plain-labeled We apply this framework to our experifoods obtain the premium as defined in mental auction data to calculate the perequation [3] . But, this premium only reprecentage of consum ers who switch to plainsents increased welfare (i.e., the publiclabeled foods in two information settings: good value of information) for consum ers those consumers initially receiving posit ive who switched to plain-labeled foods from information or those consumers initially G M-labeled foods after receiving informareceiving both positive and verifiable intion from environm ental group s. 14 formation. We then compute the average The aggregate value of information is public-goo d value of information from enthe sum of the value of information for all vironmental groups per consum er who individua ls who changed their purchases switches for each product. Finally, we estibecause of the information from environmate the average public-goo d value of inmental group s:
formation from environmental group s per consu mer in the popu lation for each product. We sugge st that these procedures pro-12 Prices for the G M-labeled and plain-labeled foods are assumed to be the mean bid prices from the auction. tially received information from biotech-TA BLE 2 Th e Per cen t a ge of Pa r t icipan t s Wh o Pu r cha se G M-La bel ed Food s wit h a n d wit h ou t In for ma t ion f r om E n vir on men t a l G r ou ps value of information from environm ental The public-good value of information groups is approxim ately 3 to 4 cents per from environm ental groups is reported in person per purchased product that is po- Table 3 . Part A reports the value to contentially G M.
15
sum ers who initially received indu stry inPart B of Table 3 shows the value of formation on agricultural biotechnology environmental group information for cononly. For tortilla chips, almost 10% of parsumers who initially received both biotechticipants changed their purchase to plainnology industry and third-party information. labeled food products from G M-labeled
Here the value of environmental informaones after receiving the environmental tion is sign ificantly lower-averaging less group information on agricultural biotechthan half of a cent for tortilla chips and nology. The average public value of inforpotatoes and about 2 cents for vegetable mation to each consum er who switched oil. A cross the three commodities, inforpurchases is 18 cents per bag, and the avermation from environmental groups is age public value to each consumer in sociworth on average less than 1 cent per perety is 1.7 cents per bag. For vegetable oil, environm ental group information caused over 18% of consu mers to switch, with an 15 R ecall we established market prices to obtain these values, and we used the samp le mean bids as the market a In the market with both positive and third-party information, adding information from environmental groups caused some people to switch to G M-lab eled tortilla chips. More participants purchased the plain-labeled varieties of the vegetable oil and the potatoes when environmental information was provided. son per produ ct. H ence, the value of inforvalue of negative G M information would be roughly $2 billion annua lly for U .S. conmation from environmental group s is consumers. 16 A lthough large, the aggregate siderably lower when participants initially value does not seem unrealistic. 17 The avreceived information from both agribusiness companies and third-party groups. This result suggest s that consumers who 16 We obtain this value by first taking the smaller received third-party information on agvalue of 3 cents per product for those who did not receive third-party inform ation on agricultural biotechnology. ricultural biotechnolo gy gave less weight Becau se the prices for these products range between to environmental group information, which $1.50 and $2.50, verifiable information has a value of decreased its public-good value to the GM about 1.5% of the purchase price. Second, using a lower antagonists.
estimate that only one-third of all foods contain some GM material and U .S. citizens spent $390 billion for food at home in 1997 (Putnum and Allshouse 1999),
V. CONCLU D ING REMA RKS
American s spent roughly $130 billion on foods that could be G M. The aggregate public value of environ-O ur results suggest that negative G Mmental information is roughly $1.95 billion annually in the U nited States. product information supplie d by environ- 17 One could argue that this estimate underestimates mental groups can significantly reduce the value for two reasons. First, we presume participants consum er demand for G M produ cts, and who did not change their habit of consuming GM prodthe pub lic-good value of this information ucts obtain no public-good value from information from environmental groups. This is a conservative assumption from environmental groups was about 3 because some participants may feel better about their cents for each of the three products purconsumption decision when it is informed by material chased by the consumers in our sample. If from environmental groups, relative to their preferwe were to take the bold step and aggreences. Second, we are considering the aggregate value from U .S. consumers only. H owever, this information gate these findings to the national level, we would also be freely available to consumers in foreign would obtain the following result. A ssume countries who make up 19/20 of the world population, the anti-biotechnology information reached which implies additional aggregate public-good value for negative G M information.
every person in the U nited States, then the erage value would be about $7.00 per year ers in two midwestern U .S. cities (not a hotbed of environmental group activity), per person, which is conside rably less than Foster and Just's value of information for it would be instructive to test consumer reactions in other regions of the U nited contaminated milk of $10.00 per m onth per person (or $120.00 per year). We have also
States. In addition, because some groups (e.g., agribusinesses) view information from shown that the distribution of independent third-party information dissipat es most of environm ental groups as a cost it would also be useful to determine the "cost" of the public good benefit of negative G Mproduct information. Because the experiinformation from environmental groups to these parties. mental data were obtained from consum-A PPE ND IX A D emogr a ph ic Ch ar a ct er ist ics of Pol k Cou nt y, Iowa , incl u ding D es Moin es ar ea, a n d R a msey Cou nt y, Min n esot a , in cl u d in g St . Pa ul ar ea a The estimate of the number of married people who are 18 or older was obtained by taking the number of people married over 15 and assuming that the number of people were married at ages 15, 16, and 17 were zero-this gives the percentage of people who are married who are 18 or older.
b The years of schooling was estimated by placing a value of 8 for those who have not completed 9 th grade, 10.5 for those who have not completed high school, 12 for those who have completed high school but have had no college, 13.5 for those with some college but no degree, 14 for those with an associate's degree, 16 for those with a bachelor's degree, and 18 for those with a graduate or professional degree.
